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PREVIEW; Nunez v. Watchtower: The Constitutional
Implications of Montana’s Statutory Cap on Punitive Damages
and Negligence Per Se Under Montana’s Child Abuse
Reporting Statute
Joseph E. Gresham*
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral
arguments in this matter on Friday, September 13, 2019, at 10:00
a.m. at the Northern Hotel in Billings, MT. Bradley J. Luck will
likely appear on behalf of the Petitioners. James P. Molloy will
likely appear on behalf of the Respondents.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents the Court with two significant issues. The
core issue before the Court is whether Montana’s statutory cap1 of
$10 million on punitive damages comports with Montana’s
Constitution.2 The second issue before the Court is whether
Petitioners Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.
(“Watchtower”) and The Christian Congregation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses (“CCJW”) are liable to Respondent Alexis Nunez
(“Nunez”), a congregant at Petitioner Montana’s Thompson Falls
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (“TFC”) for failure to report
sexual abuse under Montana’s child abuse reporting statute.3
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2004, two congregants informed a TFC Elder that
Maximo Reyes, another congregant, sexually abused them when
they were children.4 Subsequently, the TFC Elders contacted CCJW
and the legal department at Watchtower for spiritual counsel and

*

J.D. / M.B.A. Candidate, Blewett School of Law Class of 2021.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3) (2017).
2
See generally Respondent’s Response Brief at 37–47, Nunez v. Watchtower,
(Mont. July 22, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077); Brief of Attorney General at 4–5,
Nunez v. Watchtower, (Mont. July 24, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077).
3
See generally Petitioner’s Opening Brief, Nunez v. Watchtower, (Mont. May
22, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–201 (2017).
4
Id. at 4–8.
1
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legal advice about the reports of Reyes’ abuse. 5 Then, CCJW and
Watchtower instructed TFC elders not to report the allegations to
Montana authorities and to keep the situation confidential.6 TFC
complied with these requests, and the abuse continued.7
Following a realization that TFC failed to report child abuse
because of CCJW’s and Watchtowers’ instruction, two of Reyes’
victims, Nunez and Holly McGowan, sued in Montana District
Court. They then filed for summary judgment, alleging liability as
a matter of law because Petitioners knew of Reyes’ abuse and failed
to report it, which violated Montana’s mandatory reporting law.8
Petitioners cross-filed and contended that the failure to comply with
the reporting statute was excused.9
At trial, the Court instructed the Jury that TFC, CCJW, and
Watchtower were liable to Nunez under the doctrine of negligence
per se under the mandatory reporting statute, the jury awarded her
$4 million in compensatory damages and $31 million in punitive
damages.10 Further, when reviewing the award, the District Court
declared Montana’s punitive damages cap unconstitutional and
entered the jury’s verdict in full.11 Accordingly, CCJW and
Watchtower appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

In 2003, the Montana Legislature enacted a “$10 million or
3% of a defendant’s net worth, whichever is less” cap on non-class
action punitive damages.12 Further, in order to levy punitive
5

Id. at 8–10 (describing the role of each appealing party: congregations of
Jehovah’s Witnesses receive spiritual counsel, hear confessions, and provide
spiritual discipline from groups of local elders, like the ones at TFC. When
faced with an issue, local elders seek spiritual guidance from CCJW and legal
counsel from Watchtower, New York corporations set up by Jehovah’s
Witnesses).
6
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 10.
7
Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1–2, Nunez v. Watchtower, (Mont. Aug. 14, 2019)
(No. DA 19-0077).
8
Id. at 9.
9
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 2.
10
Id. at 11 (The jury found against McGowan and awarded her no damages).
11
Id. at 12.
12
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3) (2017).
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damages, a jury must find the defendant guilty of actual malice,13
then, they must evaluate the defendant’s financial background and
then submit the damage determination to the judge for review.14
While reviewing the reasonableness of the award, the judge takes
into account nine factors and is authorized to change the award
accordingly.15 The Legislature enacted the punitive damages cap in
response to the perceived consequences of unfettered punitive
damages, including increased costs of insurance premiums, swollen
costs of litigation, and adverse effects on businesses.16 For
comparison, as of 2016, only four states have statutory punitive
damages caps that resemble Montana’s limitations based on
defendant’s net worth and a specified amount.17
During the 2019 legislative session, Governor Bullock
signed HB 640, which updated laws relating to childhood sexual
abuse, namely Montana’s child abuse reporting statute.18 The
Legislature made the punishment for failure to report sexual abuse
a felony,19 and applied it retroactively.20 The reporting law requires
professionals, including clergy, that have reasonable cause to
suspect, via information about abuse obtained through their official
capacity, to report sexual abuse promptly to authorities.21 There is
13

Id. at § 27–1–221(1)(2) (“A defendant is guilty of actual malice if the
defendant as knowledge of facts and deliberately proceeds to act in conscious
disregard of the high probability of injury to the plaintiff”).
14
Id. at § 27–1–221(7)(a).
15
Id. at § 27–1–221(7)(b)(i)–(ix) (“(i) the reprehensibility of defendant’s
wrongdoing; (ii) the extent of the defendant’s wrongdoing; (iii) the intent of the
defendant in committing the wrong; (iv) the profitability of defendant’s
wrongdoing, if applicable; (v) the amount of actual damages awarded by the
jury; (vi) defendant’s net worth; (vii) previous awards of punitive damages
based upon the same act; (viii) potential or prior criminal sanctions against the
defendant based on the same wrongful act; and (ix) any other circumstances that
may operate to increase or reduce, without wholly defeating, punitive
damages.”).
16
Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2 at 2.
17
Paige Griffith, Why Don’t Punitive Damages Punish or Deter? Beyond the
Constitution toward an Economic Solution, 77 MONT. L. REV. 328, 341 (2016).
18
Amy Beth Hanson, New Montana Law Ends Statute of Limitations on Child
Sex Abuse, May 7, 2019, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, https://perma.cc/7KSF-3ZGY.
19
Ch. 367, 2019 Mont. Laws § 8 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–
207(3)); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–207(3) (2017) (previously, the punishments
for all failures to report were misdemeanors).
20
Ch. 367, 2019 Mont. Laws § 18.
21
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–201(1)–(2) (2017).
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an exception for clergy if the information was intended to be a part
of a confidential communication between the clergy and
congregant.22 Lastly, any official or institution who is obligated
under the law that fails to report abuse or reasonably prevent another
from doing so is civilly liable for the damages proximately caused
by such failure or prevention.23
A.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners argue that Montana’s $10 million statutory cap
on punitive damages is presumptively constitutional and thus the
District Court should not have entered judgment in full.24 Petitioners
assert that, under a rational basis review,25 the punitive damages cap
comports with substantive due process26 because it is reasonably
related to legislative purposes such as limiting costs of litigation
settlements or insurance premiums.27 Second, Petitioners argue that
the punitive damages cap satisfies equal protection28 because, under
a rational basis review,29 there are “real differences” between class
action and individual plaintiffs—namely, the legislative allowance
for higher awards because harms involved in class actions affect
numerous people, are more substantial, and must be divided.30
Lastly, Petitioners argue that the punitive damages cap does not
infringe on the right to a jury trial31 since there is no constitutional
right to punitive damages and the Legislature may divest the jury of
determining them in the first place.32 Concerning the punitive
damages award, Petitioners argue that it exceeds the limit of due
process, mainly because Respondent failed to adequately prove

22

Id. at § 41–3–201(6)(ii).
Id. at § 41–3–207(1).
24
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 46; Brief of Attorney General,
supra note 2, at 6 (Attorney General Fox intervenes solely to defend the
constitutionality of the punitive damages cap); Errata at 2, Nunez v. Watchtower,
(Mont. Aug. 26, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077).
25
Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 15.
26
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17.
27
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 46–47; see also Brief of Attorney
General, supra note 2, at 16–21.
28
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
29
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 49–50.
30
See Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 18–15.
31
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26.
32
Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, 22–28.
23
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Watchtower’s actions, in instructing TFC not to report, constituted
malice.33
Petitioners argue that they preserved all issues relating to
negligence per se because they objected to the jury instructions and
the verdict form during the latter half of the bifurcated trial.34
Otherwise, Petitioners present four arguments in favor of a reversal
of summary judgment on negligence per se.35 First, Petitioners argue
that the reporting law does not apply because the common law bases
of vicarious liability and agency do not subsume organizations like
Watchtower and CCJW as liable under the reporting law.36 Second,
Petitioners maintain that they fall under the reporting law’s
confidentiality exemption because the information of sexual abuse
was shared exclusively amongst clergy, within the confines of
doctrine and established practice, and at the risk of infringing on
First Amendment rights.37 Third, Petitioners argue that Nunez is not
among the “class of persons,” protected by the reporting law
because Respondents presented no evidence that CCJW or
Watchtower knew “anything about her.”38 Finally, Petitioners argue
that negligence per se does not automatically establish proximate
cause under the reporting law because a jury must determine
whether the violation was a proximate cause of the alleged harm.39
B.

Respondents’ Arguments

Initially, Respondents argue that Petitioners failed to
preserve all issues on appeal except those relating to punitive
damages because Petitioners failed to object to jury instructions and
stipulated to the verdict form that determined liability.40
Respondents primarily argue that the punitive damages cap
of $10 million is unconstitutional because it violates three tenants of
Montana’s Constitution: due process, equal protection, and right to
33

Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 22–25.
Id. at 4.
35
See generally Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 13–15.
36
Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 4
37
Id. at 16–17.
38
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 33–36.
39
Id. at 36–39.
40
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 10.
34
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trial by jury.41 First, Respondents argue that the punitive damages
cap violates due process since a “one-size-fits-all” legislative
imposition fails to fulfill the purposes of the cap to deter and punish
because of its failure to adequately address the net worth of wealthy
defendants.42 Similarly, Respondents argue that, under a rationalbasis test, the punitive damages cap violates equal protection
because it does not equally apply the claimant’s sole mechanism for
deterrence and punishment, and that cost-control fails as the only
justification for doing so.43 Further, Respondents argue that the
punitive damages cap infringes on the right to trial by jury because,
under strict scrutiny,44 the punitive damages cap usurps the jury’s
duty to assess appropriate damages to punish and deter egregious
conduct.45 Considering the award of punitive damages, Respondents
argue Petitioners failure to report, even after knowledge of the
abuse, constitutes malice and that the award is reasonable and
comports with due process.46
Additionally, Respondents argue that the District Court was
correct in granting summary judgment on negligence per se. First,
Respondents argue that Petitioners are liable under theories of
vicarious liability and agency because the reporting law does not
abrogate common law.47 Also, Respondents point out that at all
times relevant to the underlying acts, Petitioners acted according to
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ policies and practices and did so in
furtherance of the interests of their church.48 Second, Respondents
argue that the confidentiality exception to the reporting law does not
apply because there was broad disclosure of the abuse and no
requirement to keep such information confidential.49 Third,
Respondents argue that Nunez is a member of the class of protected
41

Id. at 37.
Id. at 39.
43
Id. at 37–38 (arguing that the punitive damages cap violates equal protection
because it does not equally address the (1) disparity in wealth between potential
offenders and (2) unfairly distinguishes individual plaintiffs from class action
plaintiffs).
44
Id. at 40 (citing Snetsinger, infra note 57, at 450 (holding that “strict scrutiny
applies if a suspect class or fundamental right is affected.”).)
45
Id.
46
Id. at 12–13.
47
Id. at 12.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 30–31.
42
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persons under the reporting law, because they had evidence that
Petitioners had reason to suspect Reyes’ abuse.50 Lastly,
Respondents argue that all Petitioners were the proximate cause of
Nunez’s harm because they knew of Reyes’ propensities and did
nothing to stop him.51
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Montana’s $10 Million Statutory Cap on Punitive Damages

If the Court decides to address whether the punitive damages
cap is constitutional, then its decision will likely hinge on review of
the caps’ constitutional implications regarding substantive due
process, equal protection, and right to a jury trial.52 First, under a
rational basis review,53 whether the punitive damages cap satisfies
substantive due process depends on the Court’s prioritization of the
cap’s purpose; whether it is there primarily for cost-control
purposes,54 or to deter and punish egregious conduct.55 Punitive
damages, by statute, are levied “for the sake of example and for the
purpose of punishing a defendant.”56 The Respondent advances this
argument and will likely prevail. Next, the Court will likely find that
the equal protection issue requires a strict scrutiny analysis because
the punitive damages cap imposes different burdens on different
classes of persons.57 Here, “real differences” aside,58 the Court will
likely note that, according to the plain text of the statute, individual
plaintiffs are restricted in their recoveries, but class action plaintiffs

50

Id. at 26–30 (citing Gross v. Myers 748 P.2d 459 (Mont. 1987) (where a report
was deemed reasonable when mandatory reporter was notified of and reported
abuse out of concern for abuser’s grandchildren).
51
Id. at 24–26.
52
See generally Montana Cannabis Industry Ass’n v. State, 368 P.3d 1131
(Mont. 2016) (establishing a plenary standard of review when reviewing the
constitutionality of state statutes); Griffith, supra note 17, (analyzing the
punitive damages cap in a Montana context, especially its economic and
constitutional implications).
53
Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2 at 15.
54
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 46–47; See also Brief of Attorney
General, supra note 2, at 16–21.
55
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 39.
56
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(1) (2017).
57
Snetsinger v. Montana Univ. System, 104 P.3d 445, 449–50 (Mont. 2004).
58
Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 18–15.
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are not.59 Lastly, the Court has reasoned that because they implicate
a fundamental right, laws that restrict the jury’s authority are subject
to strict scrutiny.60 Further, statute enumerates that, “liability for
punitive damages must be determined by the trier of fact.”61 Here,
the Court might reason the punitive damages cap is a seizure of a
jury’s duty to determine damages to effectively deter and punish
offenders.62
Outside the constitutional implications, the Court will likely
consider whether the award was “grossly excessive,” as both parties
address the reasonableness of the award. 63 In Seltzer v. Morton,64
the Montana Supreme Court avoided reviewing the constitutionality
of the punitive damages cap, but held that a reduced $20 million jury
punitive damages award to $9.9 million was reasonable under the
guideposts established by the U.S. Supreme Court in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore.65 The Gore guideposts consider three things:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the underlying conduct; (2) the
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages; and (3)
sanctions for comparable misconduct when determining whether or
not an award is “grossly excessive.”66 First, the Petitioners’ contend
that the conduct was “at most, good-faith nonfeasance,”67and
Respondents argue that the failure to report satisfies the required test
of reprehensibility.68 Paired with reports demonstrating the lengths
to which Jehovah’s Witness officials have gone to protect the church
interests,69 the Court may find it challenging to consider Petitioners’
actions merely a “good-faith nonfeasance,” and will be more likely
59

MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3) (2017).
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 554 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J.,
concurring).
61
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7).
62
Id. at § 27–1–220(1).
63
See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 51–54; Respondent’s
Response Brief, supra note 2, at 41.
64
154 P.3d 561 (Mont. 2007).
65
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
66
Id. at 574–584.
67
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 54.
68
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
69
See generally Daniel Avery, U.S., New Law Could Open Floodgates on
Decades of Child Sexual Abuse with Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mar. 22, 2019,
NEWSWEEK, https://perma.cc/8DS9-UNAT; Douglas Quenqua, Family, A Secret
Database of Child Abuse, Mar. 22, 2019, THE ATLANTIC,
https://perma.cc/HGW5-ESLR.
60
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to rule the underlying conduct reprehensible. On the second
guidepost, it is likely the Court will side with Respondents. Even
though Campbell and Gore show ratios that were deemed outside
the “limit of the due process guarantee,”70 here, the damages will
likely be deemed reasonable given the harm to Nunez and the
deemed reasonable Seltzer ratio of 9.9:1.71 Lastly, this Court is the
best entity to analyze the third guidepost.72 Facially, the conduct in
question is Petitioners’ failure to report sexual abuse to Montana
authorities and the criminal penalty is now a felony.73 If this Court
focuses on the underlying conduct alone, the failure to report,
Petitioners are likely to prevail on this front. However, if this Court
zooms out to include the multiple years of abuse to multiple
victims,74 and the prolonged failure to report,75 the outcome on the
third guidepost will likely favor Respondents.
Recently, Montana juries have handed down punitive
damages in excess of the punitive damages cap, but the Court has
ultimately avoided the question of constitutionality.76 Here, both
parties touch on all three constitutional bases that Montana attorneys
utilize and advance cogent arguments about the reasonableness of
70

Campbell, supra note 68, at 429 (holding that an award of $145 million in
punitive damages on a compensatory damages award of $1 million violated due
process); Gore, supra note 65, at 582 (holding that an award of $2 million in
punitive damages on $4,000 of compensatory damages was “grossly
excessive”).
71
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 52 (noting a different approach
than Respondents to what the ratio actually is—either 7.5 to 1 according to
Respondents, or 9.4 to 1 according to Petitioners).
72
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 441
(explaining that the “third Gore criterion, which calls for a broad legal
comparison, seems more suited to the expertise of the appellate courts”).
73
Ch. 367, 2019 Mont. Laws § 8 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–
207(3)).
74
Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 4–5.
75
Id. at 6–9.
76
See Masters Group International, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 352 P.3d 1101
(Mont. 2015) (Holding that a choice of law conflict precluded the District Court
from rendering the punitive damages cap unconstitutional); Order on Motion to
Dismiss at 1, Olson v. Hyundai Motor Co. (Mont. Jan. 14, 2015) (No. DA 140500) (case dismissal due to settlement between the parties where punitive
damages cap was declared unconstitutional at District Court); Joint Motion to
Dismiss at 2, Kelly Logging, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank (Mont. Sept. 15, 2015)
(No. DV 12-928) (case dismissal due to settlement between the parties where
punitive damages cap was declared unconstitutional at District Court).

2019

PREVIEW: NUNEZ V. WATCHTOWER

19

the award.77 Because these positions have been recently addressed
at the trial level, it is likely the Court will finally resolve the issue of
whether the punitive damages cap is constitutional, and if not, at
least look at the reasonableness of the award upon adjustment to
comport with the cap.
B.

Negligence Per Se

If the Court determines the issues concerning negligence per
se are preserved on appeal, which may be difficult given the
disparity between the parties’ procedural contentions, four disputes
between the parties will be reviewed. First, the parties disagree as to
whether common law doctrines of agency and vicarious liability
apply to Watchtower and CCJW. An agency relationship arises
when a principal manifests assent to another person that the agent
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control.78 In determining agency, the Court will likely look at the
facts that TFC Elders, CCJW Elders, and Watchtower attorneys all
interacted with one another under Jehovah’s Witness practices and
doctrine and did so primarily concerned with furthering principals
CCJW and Watchtower’s interests. Following an agency
determination, vicarious liability still exists for principals under the
reporting law because, even though agents were the negligent actors,
their principal is not immune from tort liability for failure to protect
a victim.79 Here, the law,80 is clear that civil liability is imposed on
any institution that “prevents another person” from reporting a child
abuser, especially when agents knew of Reyes’ history of abuse, and
watched Reyes’ attend church with Nunez, whom he continued to
abuse.81
Generally, in order to be considered confidential under the
reporting statute, a communication is required to be confidential by
canon law, church doctrine, or established church practice.82 Here,
since there was broad disclosure of the abuse (including to Reyes’
wife and other victims), and there was no showing that keeping
information about a congregant’s child abuse was required by
77

Griffith, supra note 17, at 343.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).
79
Newville v. Department of Family Servs. 883 P.2d 793, 812 (Mont. 1994).
80
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–207 (2017).
81
Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 22–24.
82
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–201(6)(c) (2017).
78
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canon,83 the Court will likely dismiss Petitioners’ argument that the
failure to disclose communications is exempted because of
confidentiality. Third, Petitioner is indeed within the “class of
persons” protected by the reporting law because of previously
established vicarious liability and the fact that every party knew of
Reyes’ history of abuse. Fourth, and finally, the Court will look to
the fact that all parties involved knew of Reyes’ capabilities of
sexually abuse young children, thus establishing Petitioners’
proximate cause for the harm of any child within this context. On all
four fronts, the Court is likely to hold Petitioners liable for
Respondents’ harm, because their primary concern was to act in
furtherance of the interests of the church, not to protect Nunez.84
V.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by the Court’s repeated avoidance on the
issue of the constitutionality of Montana’s punitive damages cap,
this case presents an excellent opportunity for the Court to silence
or empower juries and trial judges across Montana as they make
determinations about punitive damages. On the negligence per se
front, the Court will likely flesh out the religious confidentiality
exception to the reporting law and establish that vicarious liability
applies to institutions involved in collective efforts to withhold
information about child sexual abuse from Montana authorities.
Ultimately, the Court’s decision will shape punitive damage
determinations and reporting law litigation on a negligence per se
basis for years to come.

83
84

Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 30–33 (emphasis added).
Id. at 12.

